University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 29
Number 2 Spring/Summer 1999

Article 14

1999

Recent Developments: Somuah v. Flachs: A Client
Has Cause to Discharge an Attorney When the
Client Has Any Good Faith Basis for Being
Dissatisfied with the Attorney, Even Though the
Attorney Had Performed Competently
Kofi Asamoah

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Asamoah, Kofi (1999) "Recent Developments: Somuah v. Flachs: A Client Has Cause to Discharge an Attorney When the Client Has
Any Good Faith Basis for Being Dissatisfied with the Attorney, Even Though the Attorney Had Performed Competently," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 29 : No. 2 , Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol29/iss2/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

Somuah v. Flachs
A Client has Cause to Discharge an Attorney when the Client has Any Good Faith
Basis For Being Dissatisfied with the Attorney, Even though the Attorney had
Performed Competently
By Kofi Asamoah

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a client
may discharge an attorney when the
client has a good faith basis for being
dissatisfied with the attorney, even
when the attorney had performed
competently and committed no serious
. misconduct. Somuah v. Flachs, 352
Md. 241, 721 A.2d 680 (1998). The
court further held that ifthis good faith
discharge occurs, the attorney could
recover for the services rendered prior
to been discharged on a quantum
meruit theory, however, in contingency
fee contracts, the attorney could only
recover if and when the contingency
generating the fee occurs.
Millicent Somuah ("Somuah")
and her daughter sustained serious
injuries in an automobile accident while
travelling through Maryland in May
1992. Id. at 247, 721 A.2d at 683.
Attorney Jeremy Flachs ("Flachs")
visited and interviewed Somuah while
she was still recovering in a hospital
in Maryland, at which time Somuah
retained Flachs to represent her in a
personal injury claim on a contingent
fee basis. Id. After Flachs had spent
a considerable amount of time and
money to investigate the claim and to
collect and preserve evidence,
Somuah discharged Flachs in August
1992 after Flachs informed Somuah
that he was not licensed to practice
law in the State of Maryland. Id. at
248, 721 A.2d at 683. Somuah
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 68

refused to pay Flachs for the services Id. The court noted that the
confidential nature ofthe relationship,
rendered prior to the discharge. Id.
Flachs sued Somuah in the coupled with the dangers of friction
Circuit Court for Prince George's and loss of confidence, warrants a
County to recover reasonable fees for client's right for such power to end
the legal services rendered for Somuah . the relationship when necessary. Id
prior to his discharge. Id Following at 251, 721 A.2d at 684. The court
a jury trial, the court entered judgment reasoned that a client's power to
in favor of Flachs. Id. Somuah discharge an attorney is implied in the
appealed to the Court of Special retainer agreement and therefore a
Appeals ofMaryland, which affirmed, client who discharges an attorney,
holding that "[Flachs's] failure to even without good cause, does not
inform [Somuah] that he was not breach the agreement ifthe discharge
licensed in Maryland did not constitute was "based on a reasonable
good cause to discharge [Flachs], so subjective dissatisfaction with the
as to preclude his right to immediate attorney's services." Id. at251, 721
compensation for the reasonable A.2d at 684-85. The absolute right
value of services rendered prior to of a client to discharge an attorney,
[Flachs's] discharge." Id at 249, 721 according to the court, is not altered
A.2d at 684. The Court of Appeals in any way by a contingent fee
of Maryland granted certiorari and contract. Id. at 251, 721 A.2d at
reversed. Id.
685.
Beginning its analysis, the court
Because this was the first time
of appeals rejected the court of the court addressed what constitutes
special appeals' conclusion that a a proper basis for terminating an
client's right to discharge an attorney attorney-client relationship, the court
was limited to situations where the discussed its prior rulings concerning
attorney-client contract was invalid, or appropriate circumstances under
when the attorney had violated any of which an attorney's compensation
the rules ofprofessional responsibility, may be forfeited and rulings by other
a law, or the attorney-client jurisdictions that have addressed
agreement. Id at 250, 721 A.2d at causes for termination ofan attorney684. Explaining the broad powers of client relationship. Id. The court
a client, the court of appeals opined noted that in other jurisdictions almost
that an "attorney's authority to act for any good faith reason the client
the client is freely revocable by the asserted constituted cause for
client," even for subjective reasons. termination, and most courts

Recent Deve/opments
permitted recovery on the theory of
quantummeruit. Id.at252, 721 A.2d
at 685.
The court further reasoned that
because the attorney-client
relationship is analogous to an
employer-employee relationship, a
contract to employ an attorney is
terminable at will ifthe client becomes
dissatisfied with the services of the
attorney. Id. at 255,721 A.2d 687.
The court noted that a client who has
no basis for being dissatisfied with the
attorney's performance, or who has
discharged the attorney in bad faith,
is deemed to have no just cause for
discharge whereas a good faith basis
for a client's dissatisfaction is a proper
cause for discharge. Id. Proof of
incompetence, misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, or a violation of the
Rules ofProfessional Conduct are not
requirements for discharge, rather any
good faith basis for a client's
dissatisfaction with the attorney's
representation would justify a
discharge. Id. at 256, 721 A.2d at
687.
The court determined that after
the initial contact between Flachs and
Somuah, it was reasonable for
Somuah to have expected that Flachs
could handle any court proceeding.
Id. at 257, 721 A.2d at 688.
Therefore, Flachs' later disclosure that
he could not represent Somuah
without engaging local counsel
provided Somuah with a good faith
basis to be dissatisfied with the
representation. Id.
The court held that if a
dissatisfied client discharged an
attorney based on a good faith reason,
though not serious misconduct

warranting forfeiture of fees, the
attorney was entitled to recover
compensation for the services
rendered prior to the discharge. Id.
at 258, 721 A.2d 688. Such
recovery amount, the court
determined, depends on the
reasonable value of the benefits the
client received and the nature and
gravity ofthe cause ofthe discharge.

Id.
The court rejected Somuah's
argumentthat Flachs's failure to infonn
her that he was not licensed to practice
in Maryland constituted an unlawful
practice oflaw and precluded Flachs
from recovery. Id at 262, 721 A.2d
at 690. The court, instead,
determined that Flachs's mere
investigation of the personal injury
claim, by gathering and preserving
evidence in Maryland where he was
not licensed, did not constitute an
unauthorized practice oflaw. Id The
court concluded that although Flachs
was discharged for good cause, the
basis for his discharge did not justify
the forfeiture ofhis compensation for
the services rendered. Id. at 264, 721
A.2d at 691.
The court reasoned that
permitting a discharged attorney to
recover on a quantum meruit theory
prevents unjust enrichmentto the client
for the services the attorney rendered
prior to discharge. Id at 263, 721
A.2d at 691. Furthermore, noted the
court, the quantum meruit recovery
balances the interest of preserving the
right of the client to discharge his
attorney without undue restrictions
against "the attorney's right to fair
compensation for services
competently rendered prior to

discharge." Id at 264-265, 721 A.2d
at 691.
Among the factors to be
considered in determining the
reasonable value ofthe services of a
discharged attorney, the court noted
that the most salient factor is the extent
to which the attorney's services have
benefited the client. Id. at 265, 721
A.2d at 692. Reiterating its adoption
of the "New York Rule," the court
emphasized that a client's discharge
of an attorney without cause prompts
an immediate accrual ofthe attorney's
quantum meruit action, even in
contingency fee contracts. Id at 267,
721 A.2d at 693. In Somuah,
however, the court held that because
the client had a good faith basis for
being dissatisfied with the attorney
coupled with the contingent nature of
the fee contract, Flachs' s quantum
meruit recovery was conditioned upon
Somuah's recovery in her personal
injuryaction. Id.267-268, 721 A.2d
693.
The dissent argued that Sornuah
terminated the attorney-client
relationship without a material breach
on the part ofFlachs, and therefore,
the quantum meruit recovery
"unconditionally accrued at the time
oftermination." Id. at 276, 721 A.2d
at 697 (citing Skeens v. Miller, 331
Md. 331,628 A.2d 185 (1993)). By
holding otherwise, the dissent argued,
the majority has in effect overruled

Skeens. Id
In Somuah v. Flachs, the court
ofappeals enunciated a client's "good
faith basis" for discharging an attorney,
providing an intermediate standard
between "good cause" and "without
good cause." This, the court

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 69
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explained, would preserve the client's
absolute right to discharge an attorney
if the client has a reasonable basis to
be dissatisfied with the attorney. The
court's distinction between "good
cause" and "good faith basis" for
discharging an attorney may create
some confusion in its application. Trial
judges may find it difficultto distinguish
a "good faith basis" from a "good
cause" for discharge. Based on the
evidence in the case, the court could
have simply concluded that Somuah
discharged Flachs without good
cause, and would have arrived at the
same result that Flachs could recover
his fees on quantum meruit theory.

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 70

